Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: South Carolina\u27s Sexually Violent Predator Act by Cook, J. H.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 50 Issue 2 Article 11 
Winter 1999 
Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: South Carolina's Sexually 
Violent Predator Act 
J. H. Cook 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Harper Cook, Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: South Carolina's Sexually Violent Predator Act, 50 S. 
C. L. Rev. 543 (1999). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
NOTE
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS:
SOUTH CAROLINA'S SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR ACT
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 543
II. CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS ..................... 544
A. The Rise and Fall of Sexual Psychopathy Laws (1930s-1980s) . 544
B. The Emergence and Affirmance of SVP Acts (1980s-1997) .... 545
C. Practical Challenges to SVP Acts (1997 to present) ......... 547
III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S SVP ACT .............................. 548
A. Purpose ............................................ 548
B. Key Definitions ...................................... 548
C. Commitment Procedure ............................... 550
1. Multidisciplinary Team ............................ 551
2. Prosecutor's Review Committee ..................... 551
3. Attorney General's Petition ......................... 552
4. Probable Cause Hearing and Pre Trial Actions ......... 552
5. The Commitment Trial ............................. 553
6. Commitment ..................................... 553
7. Release from Commitment .......................... 554
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S SVP ACT ......... 555
A. Pretext for Punishment Challenges ...................... 555
1. Statutory Provisions as Pretext for Enhanced Punishment. 555
2. Challenges Against Prosecutors: Charging, Plea
Bargaining, and Sentencing of SVPs .................. 558
3. "Punitive Looking" Policies ........................ 559
B. Treatment Challenges ................................. 560
C. Procedural Concerns ................................. 562
V. CONCLUSION ........................................... 562
I. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1998, the South Carolina General Assembly
confronted the problem of recidivist sex offenders by passing the Sexually
1
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Violent Predator Act ("SVP Act" or "Act").' Modeled after Kansas's SVP
Act,2 South Carolina's SVP Act provides for the involuntary civil commitment
of sexually violent predators who are "mentally abnormal and extremely
dangerous."3 Civil commitment is one of the more controversial methods states
are using to augment criminal confinement.4 However, the United States
Supreme Court recently upheld the civil commitment of a sexually violent
predator under the Kansas SVP Act,5 paving the way for South Carolina and
other states to enact SVP laws.
This Note first places South Carolina's SVP Act in its historical and
societal context in Part II. Part III summarizes the Act itself, focusing on its
purpose, key definitions, and commitment procedure. Section IV explores
likely future challenges to the Act, including pretextual-use challenges, post-
commitment treatment challenges, and procedural challenges.
II. CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS
A. The Rise and Fall of Sexual Psychopathy Laws (1930s-1980s)
SVP legislation originated from the sexual psychopathy laws of the late
1930s. 6 Michigan passed America's first sexual psychopathy law in 1937,7
responding in large part to media coverage of brutal sex crimes.' Similar to
SVP acts, sexual psychopathy laws diverted sexual offenders from the
correctional system to the mental health system? Once committed, offenders
remained in mental institutions until they fully recovered, or until they were
I. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
2. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-20.
4. This Note does not examine the divisive constitutional issues raised by SVP
statutes. For analysis of these issues, see Stephen R. McAllister, The Constitutionality ofKansas
Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 419 (1997); Beverly Pearman, Note, Kansas
v. Hendricks: The Supreme Court's Endorsement of Sexually Violent Predator Statutes
Unnecessarily Expands State Civil Commitment Power, 76 N.C.L. REV. 1973 (1998); and Brian
J. Pollock, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Workable Standard for "Mental Illness" or A Push
Down the Slippery Slope Toward State Abuse of Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 319 (1998)
(footnote omitted).
5. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
6. GROUP FORTHE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MENTAL HEALTH MATERIALS CrR.,
PUB. No. 98, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30s TO THE 80s, 831, 853
(1977); see also Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath"
Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889,
889, 897 (1995) (surveying the origins of sexual psychopathy and SVP legislation).
7. Blachersupra note 6, at 897 (citing MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 780.501-.509 (Callaghan
1937) (repealed 1966-68)).
8. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 853.
9. See Blacher, supra note 6, at 897. SVP acts differ from the sexual psychopathy
laws by delaying civil commitment proceedings until after offenders have served their criminal
sentence. See id at 910.
[Vol. 50: 543
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/11
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR AcT
determined no longer to be a menace to others."0 About half of the states had
sexual psychopathy laws by the 1960s." Sexual psychopathy laws lost favor
with the legal community and particularly with the psychiatrists responsible for
the difficult task of predicting when sexual psychopaths ceased to be a danger
to others." Consequently, during the 1970s and early 1980s, most ofthese laws
were repealed or otherwise unenforced.
3
B. The Emergence and Affirmance of SVP Acts (1980s-1997)
Civil commitment of sex offenders reemerged in the late 1980s, prompted
by three brutal crimes committed by released sex offenders in the State of
Washington. 4 Outraged by a system that had failed them, Washington citizens
formed a "task force on community protection" that aggressively examined
options to traditional punitive methods." Responding to this grass roots
campaign in 1990, the Washington Legislature took two steps toward
strengthening its sex offender laws. First, Washington increased sentences for
sex crimes, created sexual offender registration laws, and loosened procedural
rules making it easier to prosecute repeat offenders.' 6 Second, to keep those
sexual offenders who were already confined from being released, Washington
passed an SVP act that civilly committed persons "'likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence."",7 Recognizing the constitutional tightrope
they were walking with this stop-gap approach, Washington beefed up the
procedural safeguards for SVP commitment to resemble standards for criminal
prosecution. These strengthened procedural protections included trial by jury,
determination beyond a reasonable doubt, and unanimous verdicts.'
The Kansas Legislature passed the Kansas SVP Act in 1994.9 Leroy
Hendricks became the first person committed under the Kansas Act after
serving a ten-year sentence for taking "indecent liberties" with two thirteen-
year-old boys.2" Hendricks appealed his commitment to the Kansas Supreme
Court on the following grounds: substantive and procedural due process, ex
10. Id. at 898.
11. See id. at 903.
12. See id. at 906.
13. See id. at 906-07.
14. See Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators', L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at
Al. Earl Shriner committed the most notorious of these three crimes. Near the end of a full 10-
year prison sentence for kidnapping and assaulting two teenage girls, Shriner wrote letters and
made drawings of an elaborate mobile torture chamber for molesting and killing children. Id.
Shriner was paroled despite efforts to commit him civilly. Id. Two years after his release, Shriner
raped a seven-year-old boy, cut off his penis, and abandoned him near death. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
20. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350, 353 (1997).
1999)
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post facto, equal protection, overbreadth, vagueness, and double jeopardy.2
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed his commitment on the substantive due
process claim, holding that the "mental abnormality" standard in the SVP
statute did not meet the prior constitutional standard of "mental illness."22 The
Kansas Supreme Court majority did not address Hendricks's ex post facto or
double jeopardy claims.' The State of Kansas appealed the reversal to the
United States Supreme Court. Hendricks filed a cross-petition to reassert his ex
post facto and double jeopardy claims.24
In a five to four decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld
Hendricks's commitment under the Kansas SVP Act." The Supreme Court
took up the following two issues: (1) on direct appeal, whether "mental
abnormality" as used in the statute comported with the prior "mental illness"
standard,26 and (2) on cross appeal, whether the Act violated Hendricks's
constitutional rights against double jeopardy and ex post facto legislation.27 All
nine justices agreed on the first issue, finding that "mental abnormality"
combined with "future dangerousness" satisfied the established, substantive
due process test.28 The Court split on the second issue, disagreeing on whether
involuntary confinement pursuant to Kansas's SVP Act was punitive and thus
violative of"the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition or its bar on expost
facto lawmaking."29
The majority cited several reasons why the Kansas SVP Act was not
punitive. First, the statute's wording and its placement in the probate code
evidenced an intent that itbe civil in nature.30 Second, because commitment did
not require a prior, criminal conviction, the purpose of the statute was not to
promote retribution or deterrence.3 Third, the Court found that affirmative
restraint, even for an indefinite period, was not punishment in fact.32 Fourth, the
statute's use of criminal procedure in the commitment process "[did] not
transform a civil commitment proceeding into a criminal prosecution." 3 Fifth,
21. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133 (Kan. 1996).
22. Id. at 138 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (establishing the
two-pronged standard for civil commitment, which requires proof of mental illness and future
dangerousness)).
23. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
24. Id. at 350.
25. Id. at 348, 350.
26. Id. at 356.
27. Id. at 360-61.
28. See id. at 356, 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 360-61; see also id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding the Kansas
SVP Act non-punitive); id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the Kansas SVP Act punitive).
The Court laid the burden on Hendricks to provide the "'clearest proof' that 'the statutory
scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem
it 'civil."' Id. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248-49 (1980)).
30. Id. at 361.
31. Id. at 361-62.
32. Id. at 363.
33. Id. at 364-65.
Vol. 50: 543
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the Kansas SVP Act provided for the minimum constitutional standards of
treatment.34
The dissent found Hendrick's involuntary commitment under the Kansas
SVP Act to be punitive in nature and focused on the statute's lack of treatment
requirements.35 Justice Breyer wrote:
The Act explicitly defers diagnosis, evaluation, and
commitment proceedings until a few weeks prior to the
"anticipated release" of a previously convicted offender from
prison. But why, one might ask, does the Act not commit and
require treatment of sex offenders sooner, say, soon after they
begin to serve their sentences?36
The dissent also noted that Kansas basically had no treatment procedures in
place when Hendricks was committed or by the time of the Kansas Supreme
Court's decision.37
In his majority concurrence, Justice Kennedy first emphasized the Justices'
area of agreement. He noted: "It seems the dissent, too, would validate the
Kansas statute as to persons who committed the crime after its enactment, and
it might even validate the statute as to Hendricks, assuming a reasonable level
of treatment."3 s Justice Kennedy went on to warn states against abusing the
civil nature of SVP acts, writing: "If, however, civil confinement were to
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown
that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for
concluding that civil detention is justified, our precedents would not suffice to
validate it."'39
C. Practical Challenges to SVP Acts (1997 to present)
In the wake of Hendricks, many more states, including South Carolina, are
passing SVP acts,40 leaving courts, lawyers, and custodial agencies to tackle
tough issues that the United States Supreme Court did not address. For
example, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the Kansas SVP Act against
constitutional challenges not addressed in Hendricks, including: procedural
due process, equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, overbreadth, and
34. Id. at 365-68.
35. Id. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 393 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. As of February, 1999, 10 states have passed SVP laws: Arizona, California,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. For
a comparison of the state SVP acts, see Roxanne Lieb & Scott Matson, Sexual Predator
Commitment Laws in the United States: 1998 Update, 1998 WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y.
1999]
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vagueness grounds.4' In light of the new SVP acts that infuse criminal
procedure into a civil trial, prosecutors must confront practical issues such as
the impact of plea negotiations, the admissibility of evidence, and the recalling
of victims to testify in the commitment proceeding many years after the
criminal trial. Custodial agencies must wrestle with how to house and how to
treat the committed persons. 42 Finally, mental health practitioners must testify
whether a committed person should be released. This duty includes the difficult
task of predicting the future dangerousness of committed persons while they
reside in a controlled environment.43
III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S SVP ACT
A. Purpose
Codified in the health chapter of the South Carolina Code,' the SVP Act's
stated purpose is to improve "the existing civil commitment process [that] is
inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the
risks that they present to society."45 Noting the "nature of the mental conditions
from which sexually violent predators suffer and the dangers they present," the
South Carolina General Assembly determined "it is necessary to house
involuntarily committed sexually violent predators in secure facilities separated
from persons involuntarily committed under traditional civil commitment
statutes."' The purpose provision adds, "[t]he civil commitment of sexually
violent predators is not intended to stigmatize the mentally ill community."47
B. Key Definitions
Under the Act, a "sexually violent predator" is a person who "(a) has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in
acts ofsexualviolence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control,
41. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d 666, 672-76 (Kan. 1998).
42. Minnesota has the oldest and most comprehensive treatment program in the
country, housing 130 committed persons as of Summer 1998. See Lieb & Matson, supra note 40,
at 10.
43. See, e.g., Dennis M. Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictions of Sex Offender
Recidivism, and the "SexualPredator" Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAV. Sci. &L. 97, 110 (1998);
Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standardfor Predictions of Dangerousness
in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L., Mar. 1997, at 33, 59-6 1.
44. Placing the statute in the probate code was one factor the United States Supreme
Court cited when determining the Kansas SVP Act evidenced civil rather than criminal intent.
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
46. Id.
47. Id.
[Vol. 50: 543
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care, and treatment.' s
The definition of "sexually violent offense" incorporates fourteen specific
criminal sex acts,49 as well as "any offense forwhich the judge makes a specific
finding on the record that based on the circumstances of the case, the person's
offense should be considered a sexually violent offense."' "Conviction" of any
of the above offenses means a person has:
(a) pled guilty to, pled nolo contendere to, or been convicted
of;
(b) been adjudicated delinquent as a result of the commission
of;
(c) been charged but determined to be incompetent to stand
trial for;
(d) been found not guilty by reason of insanity of; or
(e) been found guilty but mentally ill of a sexually violent
offense.5
The Act defines several other important terms. "'Mental abnormality'
48. Id. § 44-48-30(1) (emphasis added).
49. The 14 criminal sex offenses incorporated in the statute are:
(a) criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, as provided in
Section 16-3-652;
(b) criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, as provided
in Section 16-3-653;
(c) criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, as provided in
Section 16-3-654;
(d) criminal sexual conduct with minors in the first degree, as
provided in Section 16-3-655(1);
(e) criminal sexual conduct with minors in the second degree,
as provided in Sectionl6-3-655(2) and (3);
(f) engaging a child for a sexual performance, as provided in
Section 16-3-810;
(g) producing, directing, or promoting sexual performance by
a child, as provided in Section 16-3-820;
(h) assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, as
provided in Section 16-3-656;
(i) incest, as provided in Section 16-15-20;
(j) buggery, as provided in Section 16-15-120;
(k) committing or attempting lewd act upon child under
sixteen, as provided in Section 16-15-140;
(I) violations of Article 3, Chapter 15 of Title 16 involving a
minor when the violations are felonies;
(in) accessory before the fact to commit an offense enumerated
in this item and as provided for in Section 16-1-40;
(n) attempt to commit an offense enumerated in this item as
provided by Section 16-1-80.
Id. § 44-48-30(2)(a)-(n).
50. Id. § 44-48-30(2)(o).
51. Id. § 44-48-30(6).
1999]
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means a mental condition affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity
that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses."5 ' "Personality
disorder," an alternative to "mental abnormality" in the definition of a sexually
violent predator, is not defined in the Act. 3 "'Likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence' means the person's propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is
of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others. ' 4
C. Commitment Procedure
The commitment procedure begins when a person convicted of a sexually
violent offense is scheduled to be released from custody. The agency with
jurisdiction5 must give written notice56 to the multidisciplinary team 7 and to
the Attorney General ninety days prior to the person's release 8 or hearing. 9
The statute requires a person's"0 parole or conditional release to be suspended
for ninety days while the person's records are processed for SVP
commitment." The person's parole or conditional release is voided if the
person is ultimately committed under the statute. 2
52. Id. § 44-48-30(3).
53. A clinical definition of personality disorder will likely be used. Interview with
Mark Binkley, General Counsel for the South Carolina Department of Mental Health, in
Columbia, S.C. (Sept. 15, 1998).
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
55. "Agency with jurisdiction" means
that agency which, upon lawful order or authority,
releases a person serving a sentence or term of
confinement and includes the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, the South Carolina
Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon
Services, the Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon
Services, the Department of Juvenile Justice, the
Juvenile Parole Board, and the Department of Mental
Health.
Id. § 44-48-30(5). Agencies and individuals acting in good faith are protected from civil or
criminal liability under the Act. Id. § 44-48-40(D).
56. The notice must contain "(1) the person's name, identifying factors, anticipated
future residence, and offense history; and (2) documentation of institutional adjustment and any
treatment received." Id. § 44-48-40(C).
57. See infra Part III.C. 1.
58. Id. § 44-48-40(A)(1), (4).
59. See id. § 44-48-40(A)(2) (setting the 90-day limit prior to a person's fitness to
stand trial hearing); id. § 44-48-40(A)(3) (setting the 90-day limit prior to a person's not-guilty-
by-reason-of-insanity hearing).
60. The term "person" under the statute means "an individual who is a potential or
actual subject of proceedings under [the SVP Act] and includes a child under seventeen years
of age." Id. § 44-48-30(10).
61. Id. § 44-48-40(B).
62. See id.
[Vol. 50: 543
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1. Multidisciplinary Team63
Within thirty days after receiving notice from the agency withjurisdiction,
the multidisciplinary team reviews the person's records 4 to determine if the
person meets the definition of sexually violent predator.65 If the
multidisciplinary team determines that the person satisfies the definition, it
must forward its assessment to the prosecutor's review committee with all
records relevant to its assessment.66
2. Prosecutor's Review Committee67
Within thirty days after receiving the assessment and records from the
multidisciplinary team, "[t]he prosecutor's review committee shall determine
whether or not probable cause exists to believe the person is a sexually violent
predator."6" The Act requires the prosecutor's review committee to consider
information that the circuit solicitor who prosecuted the person provided in
addition to the records and reports that the multidisciplinary team forwarded to
the committee. 69
63. The multidisciplinary team is appointed by the Director of the Department of
Corrections and consists of:
(1) a representative from the Department of
Corrections;
(2) a representative from the Department of
Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services;
(3) a representative from the Department of
Mental Health who is a trained, qualified
mental health clinician with expertise in
treating sexually violent offenders;
(4) a retired judge appointed by the Chief
Justice who is eligible for continued
judicial service pursuant to Section 2-19-
100; and
(5) the Chief Attorney of the Office of
Appellate Defense or his designee.
Id. § 44-48-50. The Director of the Department of Corrections or his designee shall be the
chairman of the team. Id.
64. "These records may include, but are not limited to, the person's criminal offense
record, any relevant medical or psychological records, treatment records, and any disciplinary
or other records formulated during confinement or supervision." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. "The Attorney General shall appoint a prosecutor's review
committee.... includ[ing], but not... limited to, a member of the staff of the Attorney General,
an elected circuit solicitor, and a victim's representative. The Attorney General or his designee
shall be the chairman of the committee." Id. § 44-48-60.
68. Id.
69. Id.
1999]
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3. Attorney General's Petition
Within thirty days of receiving the probable cause determination from the
prosecutor's review committee, "the Attorney General may file a petition with
the court in the jurisdiction where the person committed the offense."7 This
discretionary language allows the Attorney General to end the commitment
procedure by not filing a petition despite a probable cause determination by the
prosecutor's review committee. However, if filed the petition must request that
the court determine whether or not the person is a sexually violent predator.7
The Act requires the court to make that determination upon filing of the
petition."
4. Probable Cause Hearing and Pre Trial Actions
Within seventy-two hours after taking the person into custody,73 the court
must hold aprobable cause hearing.74 At the hearing, the court must "(1) verify
the detainee's identity; (2) receive evidence and hear argument from the person
and the Attorney General; and (3) determine whether probable cause exists to
believe that the person is a sexually violent predator.""5 The Act permits the
State to "supplement the petition with additional documentary evidence or live
testimony."76 During the probable cause hearing persons have the right (1) to
counsel, (2) to present evidence on their behalf, (3) to cross-examine witnesses
testifying against them, and (4) to view and duplicate all court-filed petitions
and reports.77 If the court makes a probable cause finding, the person is
transferred to a secure facility for an evaluation as to whether the person is a
sexually violent predator." The Act provides that "[w]ithin sixty days after the
completion of a hearing.., the court shall conduct a trial."79 This provision
appears to condition a trial upon completion of the probable cause hearing
70. Id. § 44-48-70 (emphasis added). "The petition must allege that the person is a
sexually violent predator and must state sufficient facts that would support a probable cause
allegation." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 44-48-80(A).
73. "If the court determines that probable cause exists to believe that the person is a
sexually violent predator, the person must be taken into custody if he is not already confined in
a secure facility." Id.
74. Id. § 44-48-80(B).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 44-48-80(C).
78. Id. § 44-48-80(D). "The evaluation must be conducted by a qualified expert
approved by the court at the probable cause hearing." Id. The next section of the Act provides
that persons may retain their own qualified expert to perform the examination. Id. § 44-48-90.
If indigent, the court shall "assist the person in obtaining the expert to perform an examination
or participate in the trial on the person's behalf." Id.
79. Id. § 44-48-90 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 50: 543
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rather than upon a probable cause determination at the hearing. Assuming this
to be a drafting error, the legislature probably intended to require the trial to
occur within sixty days of a probable cause determination at the hearing.8"
As long as the person is not substantially prejudiced, either party may
request a continuation of the trial upon showing of good cause, or the court
may continue the trial on its own motion in the "due administration of
justice."'"
5. The Commitment Trial
The commitment trial will be heard by ajudge unless the Attorney General
or the person requests a jury trial.82 At the commitment trial, the court or jury
must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent
predator." A jury verdict must be unanimous.8 4 If the court or jury does not so
find, the court must order the person's release. If the trial is declared a
mistrial, the subsequent trial must be held within ninety days, during which
time the person is to be "held at an appropriate secure facility including, but not
limited to, a local or regional detention facility until another trial is
conducted." 6 The person has the right to appeal an adverse judgment, during
which time the person "must be committed to the custody of the Department
of Mental Health."87
6. Commitment
If the State carries its burden at trial, the person is to be "committed to the
custody of the Department of Mental Health for control, care, and treatment
until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has
so changed that the person is safe to be at large."88 While under its care, the
Department of Mental Health (DMH) must keep the person in a secure facility
80. The sentence following the provision includes the phrase, "[w]ithin thirty days
after the determination of probable cause by the court pursuant to Section 44-48-80." Id.
(emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id. Parties must request a jury trial in writing within 30 days after the probable
cause hearing. Id.
83. Id. § 44-48-100(A).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
1999]
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and segregate the person from other patients 9 under DMH supervision."
Additionally, DMH "may enter into an interagency agreement with the
Department of Corrections [(SCDC)] for the control, care, and treatment of
these persons."9' Under an interagency agreement, SCDC must keep the person
"in a secure facility and must, if practical and to the degree possible, be housed
and managed separately from offenders in the custody of the Department of
Corrections." 92 Once committed, the person must be treated in accordance with
the minimum constitutional standards for adequate treatment. 93 Additionally,
the person must have an annual examination of her mental condition.9" "The
annual report must be provided to the court which committed the person
pursuant to [the Act], the Attorney General, the solicitor who prosecuted the
person, and the multidisciplinary team."9'
7. Release from Commitment
A person committed under the Act remains committed until a court
determines "the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so
changed that the person is safe to be at large and, if released, is not likely to
commit acts of sexual violence. 9 6 Release proceedings may be initiated by the
Director of DM-197 pursuant to annual review9 or may be commenced by the
89. The use of "other patients" is inaccurate because the General Assembly amended
§ 44-22-10(11) of the SVP Act to exclude SVP committed persons from DMHs definition of
patient. Id. § 44-22-10(11). For a discussion of this amendment, see infra notes 114-15 and
accompanying text.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
91. Id.
92. Id. The precatory "if practical and to the degree possible" language appears to
permit a lower standard of care than the person would receive under DMH confinement. See
infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of this provision.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-170 ("The involuntary detention or commitment of a
person pursuant to this chapter shall conform to constitutional requirements for care and
treatment."). For a discussion of required treatment, see infra Part IV.B.
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-110. The State must provide the examiner unless the
person retains his own examiner. Id.
95. Id. Although this provision of the Act does not articulate who is to provide this
report, DMH should be the agency to compile and forward the annual report.
96. Id. § 44-48-120.
97. Section 44-48-120 states:
If the Director of the Department of Mental Health
determines that the person's mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that the person is
safe to be at large and, if released, is not likely to
commit acts of sexual violence, the director shall
authorize the person to petition the court for release.
... The burden of proof is upon the Attorney General
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner's mental abnormality or personality
disorder remains such that the petitioner is not safe to
be at large and, that if released, is likely to commit
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offender.99 Once released from SVP commitment, the person must comply with
the sex offender registry statute.'00
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S SVP ACT
A. Pretext for Punishment Challenges
Justice Kennedy's frank warning in Hendricks invites committed sex
offenders to challenge civil commitment as a mere pretext for enhanced
punishment.'0 ' Committed SVP's in South Carolina canraise pretext challenges
in several ways. First, South Carolina's SVP Act contains several provisions
that appear to undermine the Act's civil purpose-namely, the DMH/SCDC
interagency agreement and the amendment that excludes committed SVPs from
being defined as "patients."'0 2 Second, committed persons may challenge how
well state prosecutors integrate the SVP commitment process with regular
criminal prosecutions.0 3 Finally, committed persons may challenge any
"punitive-looking" policies that state agencies may implement pursuant to the
Act.'04
1. Statutory Provisions as Pretext for Enhanced Punishment
Several provisions in the SVP Act appear to undermine the South Carolina
General Assembly's stated purpose to improve "the existing civil commitment
process [which] is inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent
predators and the risks they present to society."' '
Section 44-48-100 provides in pertinent part:
The control, care, and treatment must be provided at a facility
operated by the Department of Mental Health. At all times, a
person committed for control, care, and treatment by the
Department of Mental Health pursuant to this chapter must be
kept in a secure facility, and the person must be segregated at
all times from other patients under the supervision of the
acts of sexual violence.
Id.
98. Id. § 44-48-110.
99. Id.; see also id. § 44-48-130 (limiting one's ability to file frivolous petitions).
100. Id. § 44-48-160. For a discussion of the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry
Act, see Christy E. Ford, Comment, Duty to Warn and Public Notification of the Release of Sex
Offenders, 49 S.C.L. REV. 1131 (1998).
101. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also supra notes 19-39 and accompanying text (discussing Hendricks).
102. Infra Part IV.A.1.
103. Infra Part IV.A.2.
104. Infra Part IV.A.3.
105. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-20 (emphasis added).
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Department of Mental Health. The Department of Mental
Health may enter into an interagency agreement with the
Department of Corrections for the control, care, and
treatment of these persons. A person who is in the
confinement of the Department of Corrections pursuant to an
interagency agreement authorized by this chapter must be
kept in a secure facility and must, ifpractical and to the
degree possible, be housed and managed separately from
offenders in the custody of the Department of Corrections." 6
The "interagency agreement" provision gives rise to the inference that the Act
is a pretext for punishment because it authorizes the transfer of control, care,
and treatment from DMH to SCDC without any limitation on time or
conditions of confinement, other than precatory segregation. 0 7 It is likely that
the legislature included this provision to encourage SCDC and DMH to work
together to implement the custodial aspects of the new SVP program.'08
However, the General Assembly arguably went too far by authorizing a shift
of the entire scope of DMH authority to SCDC in order to foster this
cooperation. The interagency agreement provision itself, regardless of its
implementation, appears to undermine the Act's stated purpose and may
unnecessarily raise pretext challenges.
In 1991, the South Carolina General Assembly passed laws outlining the
106. Id. § 44-48-100(A) (emphasis added).
107. The purpose provision of the Act supports segregation between SVPs and other
mental health patients. Section 44-48-20 states:
The General Assembly also determines that, because
of the nature of the mental conditions from which
sexually violent predators suffer and the dangers they
present, it is necessary to house involuntarily
committed sexually violent predators in secure
facilities separated from persons involuntarily
committed under traditional civil commitment
statutes. The civil commitment of sexually violent
predators is not intended to stigmatize the mentally ill
community.
Id. § 44-48-20 (emphasis added). Precatory segregation between SVPs and SCDC inmates, while
in line with the purpose provision, may raise pretext challenges by treating committed SVPs
differently than regular DMH committed persons.
108. DMH and SCDC have entered into an interagency agreement which provides
that the Edisto Unit of the Broad River Correctional Institution (a 24-bed facility) will be used
to house committed SVPs. Under the agreement, DMH retains all control, care, and treatment
aspects inside the Edisto Unit including internal guards, routine maintenance, and sanitation.
DMH also arranges for medical, dental, and barber care for the committed persons. SCDC
responsibilities under the agreement include: security outside of the Edisto Unit, meals, laundry
services, and chaplain services. The agreement does not transfer any care, control, or treatment
duties from DM11 to SCDC. Interagency Agreement Between the South Carolina Department of
Corrections and the South Carolina Department of Mental Health (Apr. 29, 1998) (on file with
the South Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Interagency Agreement].
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rights of mental health patients.' 9 In addition to a provision defining patients'
rights generally," these laws recognize a patient's right to (1) the least
restrictive care necessary,"' (2) a treatment plan suited to the individual needs
of the patient,"2 and (3) a scheduled review of assessment."13
Concurrent with the passage of the SVP Act, the General Assembly
amended the state's regular commitment statute to exclude committed SVPs
from the statute's definition of patient. The amendment states, "'[P]atient'
means an individual undergoing treatment in the department [of Mental
Health]; however, the term does not include a person committed to the
department pursuant to [the SVP Act]..' 4 A committed SVP who is not
afforded the same rights as a DMH patient can argue the amendment is a
pretext for enhanced punishment. In one sentence, the amendment succinctly
delineates between two groups-committed SVPs without patient rights and
all others under DMH care with patient rights. Sex offenders who have served
their criminal sentence and are civilly committed under the Act are not afforded
the rights of other persons committed under the health code within which the
General Assembly placed the Act. Committed SVPs may assert that the denial
of these patient rights (such as the right to vote, to marry or divorce, and to a
treatment plan suited to each patient's individual needs) exceeds the civil
authority of the Act and indicates a pretext for enhanced punishment.
109. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-22-10 to -220.
110. Id. § 44-22-80. This section provides that:
Unless apatienthas been adjudicated incompetent, no
patient may be denied the right to:
(1) dispose of property, real and personal;
(2) execute instruments;
(3) make purchases;
(4) enter into contractual relationships;
(5) hold a driver's license;
(6) marry or divorce;
(7) be a qualified elector if otherwise
qualified. The county board of voter
registration in counties with department
facilities reasonably shall assist patients
who express a desire to vote to:
(a) obtain voter registration
forms, applications for absentee ballots,
and absentee ballots;
(b) comply with other
requirements which are a prerequisite for
voting;
(c) vote by absentee ballot if
necessary.
Id.
S111. Id. § 44-22-50(E).
112. Id. § 44-22-60(B).
113. Id. § 44-22-70.
114. Id. § 44-22-10(1 1) (emphasis added).
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The amendment leaves DMH free to define "long-term treatment" of
SVPs, bound only by the minimum constitutional standards of treatment." 5
Even though the "long-term treatment" plan DMH implements may pass
constitutional scrutiny, the legislature's decision to exclude SVPs from the
definition of "patient" raises an inference of pretext for enhanced punishment.
2. Challenges Against Prosecutors: Charging, Plea Bargaining,
and Sentencing of SVPs
When prosecuting sex offense cases, prosecutors must remain cognizant
of possible future SVP commitment." 6 The Act may discourage pleas and
115. The SVP Act provides that "[t]he involuntary detention or commitment of a
person pursuant to this chapter shall conform to constitutional requirements for care and
treatment." Id. § 44-48-170.
116. A comprehensive article published by the National District Attorney's
Association addresses this point:
[S]ome prosecutors and judges may be tempted to
accord offenders more lenient sentencing
consideration premised on the belief that if the
offender is truly dangerous, he will subsequently be
confined under the SVP law. This perspective is
dangerous for several reasons.
First, the vast majority of convicted
offenders are not statutorily eligible for SVP
treatment because they are not incarcerated and, even
among incarcerated offenders, only a small
percentage actually satisfy the criteria for filing of a
petition. Second, the Hendricks decision itselfwarned
against using SVP laws as a backstop for poor plea
negotiations and dispositions.
Third, and most importantly, the vast
majority of plea negotiations and sentencing
decisions are made without adequate knowledge
about the offender. Complete psychological, sexual
and risk assessments are generally not conducted
prior to the plea or disposition, the offender's past
offense history may be unknown and his amenability
to treatment has notbeen established. Conversely, the
knowledge gleaned from a[n] SVP evaluation
generally provides significantly greater information
from which a reasoned decision about offender
management can be made. Prosecutors should be
making efforts to get better evaluations conducted of
offenders prior to disposition, rather than resting on
the assurance that SVP statutes will act as a safety net
to keep in the truly dangerous offenders.
Brian K. Holmgren, Sexually Violent PredatorStatutes-ImplicationsforProsecutors and Their
Communities, PROSECUTOR, May-June 1998, at 20, 29-30.
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encourage trials for persons charged with a predicate.sex offense." 7 The Act
also may encourage prosecutors to seek convictions for predicate offenses. 8
In his concurrence in Hendricks, Justice Kennedy addressed this point
specifically:
If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after
the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal
side, then it is not performing its proper function. These
concerns persist whether the civil confinement statute is put
on the books before or after the offense. We should bear in
mind that while incapacitation is a goal common to both the
criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and
general deterrence are reserved for the criminal system alone.
*. . If, however, civil confinement were to become a
mechanism for retribution or general deterrence .. .our
precedents would not suffice to validate it." 9
3. "Punitive Looking" Policies
Committed persons may raise the very practical issue that civil
commitment and traditional confinement look and feel the same. From their
perspective, SVPs might ask: "If my cell and my privileges are the same as
when I was in jail, what difference does it make that the guard is wearing a
DMH uniform?" The Hendricks majority and dissent agreed that the civil
authority of SVP acts makes the constitutional difference. 20 However, because
a reviewing court will likely weigh all factors that look punitive, custodial
agencies that adopt policies pursuant to the SVP Act should be wary of
adopting "punitive looking" policies.
Two policy issues outside the SVP Act may raise an inference of pretext.
First, the Edisto Unit has not been slated for licensing as a DMH hospital. A
decision not to license the facility further distinguishes SVPs from traditionally
committed persons and raises an inference of pretext similar to the amended
definition of patient. Second, the current interagency agreement between DMH
117. A predicate offense means the person has been "convicted of a sexually violent
offense," which, under the SVP Act, includes guilty and nolo contendere pleas. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-48-30(6)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
118. Id. § 44-48-30(2) (incorporating 14 criminal sex offenses which may serve as
a predicate offense).
119. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. The majority wrote, "We have already observed that, under the appropriate
circumstances and when accompanied by proper procedures, incapacitation may be a legitimate
end of the civil law." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,373
(1986)). The dissent added, "Civil commitment of dangerous, mentally ill individuals by its very
nature involves confinement and incapacitation. Yet 'civil commitment,' from a constitutional
perspective, nonetheless remains civil." Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citingAllen, 478 U.S.
at 369-70).
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and SCDC requires committed persons to follow SCDC personal property
policies. 2' This provision raises a pretext by using SCDC rules to shape the
daily lives of SVPs. If stricter standards are necessary for the proper
administration of SVPs (such as monitoring their books, magazines, or
television viewing), DMH could easily adopt its own "SVP Personal Property
Policy" rather than implement the SCDC policies.
B. Treatment Challenges"
The United States Supreme Court in Hendricks did not rule upon the
standard of treatment a State must provide to a committed SVP. To a large
degree, Kansas had to defend its system because it failed to have any treatment
121. Interagency Agreement, supra note 108, at 4.
122. DMH was developing its treatment program as this Note was being written,
drawing from the treatment programs of other states including Kansas, Wisconsin, Washington,
and Minnesota. According to a September 1998 report by the Washington State Institute for
Public Policy, Minnesota's treatment program is considered one of the most comprehensive,
housing 130 committed persons. See Lieb & Matson, supra note 40, at 22. A Minnesota program
overview outlines the following general goals for its committed persons:
1. Accepting responsibility for sexual
behavior without cognitive distortion.
2. Identification of sex offense behavior
cycle and development of a relapse
prevention program.
3. Development of victim empathy.
4. Development of sexual identity, sexual
knowledge, and awareness of sexual
arousal. Also, reduction in disordered
sexual arousal.
5. Resolution of issues related to personal
victimization and family dysfunction
which interfere with progress in treatment.
6. Identification of cognitive distortions in
interpersonal relationships.
7. Identification and appropriate expression
of feelings.
8. Development of appropriate social
relationships.
9. Completion of educational and vocational
goals.
10. Identification ofappropriate recreation and
leisure activities.
11. Management of identified psychiatric
disorders.
12. Chemical dependency treatment when
indicated.
The Minnesota Sex Offender Program (undated) (on file with the South Carolina Law Review)
(to request a copy contact Anita Schlank or Rick Harry at Il I Highway 73, Moose Lake, MN
55767).
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ready for its first committees, including Hendricks."n The majority was willing
to excuse this, stating that "[a]Ithough the treatment program initially offered
Hendricks may have seemed somewhat meager, it must be remembered that he
was the first person committed under the Act." '124 The majority also noted that,
"[w]hat is significant, however, is that Hendricks was placed under the
supervision of the Kansas Department of Health and Social and Rehabilitative
Services, housed in a unit segregated from the general prison population and
operated not by employees of the Department of Corrections, but by other
trained individuals.', 25 The dissent found the Kansas statute had a punitive
effect due to the lack of a treatment program for Hendricks, 26 the absence of
mandatory treatment during the person's criminal sentence, 7 and the lack of
"less restrictive alternatives, such as postrelease supervision, halfway houses,
or other methods."'28
As discussed above, the South Carolina SVP Act mandates that care and
treatment conform to minimum constitution requirements.129 Prior case law has
shaped different standards for mental hospitals and for correctional institutions.
One recent South Carolina Court of Appeals case stated the constitutional
minimum for treatment in mental hospitals is "accepted standards of
professional care."' 30 This subjective standard for mental hospitals is much
higher in comparison to care required in correctional institutions. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the treatment standard for correctional
institutions to be "adequate medical services.''. However, because the Edisto
123. "The court found that, as of the time of Hendricks's commitment, the State had
not funded treatment, it had not entered into treatment contracts, and it had little, if any, qualified
treatment staff." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (citing In re Hendricks, 912
P.2d 129, 131, 136 (Kan. 1996)).
124. Id. at 367-68. The majority also noted that by the time the case had reached the
United States Supreme Court, Kansas was providing its committed SVPs approximately 31.5
hours of treatment per week. Id. at 368 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15).
125. Id. at 368. The Supreme Court's footnote to this sentence reads:
We have explained that the States enjoy wide latitude
in developing treatment regimens. In Allen v. Illinois,
for example, we concluded that "the State serves its
purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually
dangerous persons by committing them to an
institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric
care and treatment." By this measure, Kansas has
doubtless satisfied its obligation to provide available
treatment.
Id. at 368, n.4 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-48-170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); see supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
130. Bishop v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 323 S.C. 158, 162,743 S.E.2d
814, 816 (Ct. App. 1996).
131. Sweetv. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854,864 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Unit is not slated for licensing as a hospital and because committed SVPs are
not "patients," it is unclear what degree of care a court would impose when
reviewing the sufficiency of treatment for committed SVPs. The question is
further complicated by the ability of DMH to transfer control, care, and
treatment to SCDC with an interagency agreement.
A federal district court reviewing Washington's SVP Act applied the
subjective mental health standard.' The court held that Washington made
inadequate progress toward a comprehensive treatment program.'33 The court
appointed a special master to oversee the program's progress toward achieving
the court-ordered conditions.'34
C. Procedural Concerns
Although SVP proceedings are civil, many criminal law protections are
affordedthe offender during the commitmentprocess. The South Carolina SVP
Act provides a basic framework for commitment procedure but leaves out
many procedural details. Some of the questions left unanswered are: "Do civil
or criminal discovery rules apply? Do the offender's 'rights of confrontation'
applicable in criminal cases apply and create additional burdens for the
admission of hearsay evidence? . . .What limitations are placed on how
experts orjurors may consider 'prior conduct' evidence?' 35 As more and more
offenders are committed as SVPs, courts and lawyers must sort out these
procedural details.
V. CONCLUSION
Although modem SVP legislation boasts a relatively short-lived history,
civil commitment of sexual offenders is not a novel approach to combating
recidivist sex offenders. The sexual psychopathy laws of the past enjoyed
immediate popularity but quickly lost favor with the legal community and with
psychiatrists who had to predict "future dangerousness." While modem SVP
acts may have improved some of the shortfalls of the sexual psychopathy laws,
some potential pitfalls remain. The most notable legal challenges ahead involve
avoiding pretext for punishment and providing adequate, long term treatment.
The South Carolina legislature can improve the current SVP Act by
amending the provisions that raise an inference of pretext, especially the
amended definition of patient and the SCDC/DMH interagency agreement.
Because treating these persons is an expressed goal of the SVP Act, the
132. See Scott Matson & Roxanne Lieb, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws, 1997
WASH. ST. INST. FORPUB. POL'Y 3 (citing Turay v. Weston, No. C91-664WD (W.D. Wash. June
6, 1994) (unpublished order and injunction)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Holmgren, supra note 116, at 32.
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legislature should consider raising the treatment standard above constitutional
minimums. Additionally, the legislature should consider improving the law by
requiring potential SVPs to be identified and treated while they are serving
their criminal sentence.
Overall, South Carolina's SVP Act cannot cure the shortcomings of the
correctional system nor prevent sex offenders from reoffending. However, if
state agencies are properly resourced,'36 and if courts and lawyers judiciously
implement the SVP Act to commit only the narrow group of mentally
dysfunctional persons who pose a future risk to society, the Act can serve its
preventative purpose of protecting future victims from recidivist sex offenders.
J. Harper Cook
136. See Anna Clark, Tabfor SexPredators Program in S.C. Skyrockets into Millions,
THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 14, 1999, at Al (discussing a proposed budget increase for
the SVP program from an initial $140,000 to $4 million).
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